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INTRODUCTION
The jury is a fundamental component in the implementation of
justice in America. Notably, Thomas Jefferson heralded the jury as more
essential and critical to American justice than the right to vote.' Because
the jury trial is central to the community's "vision of the legal system...
[it] is important both symbolically and substantively."2
In many types of proceedings, however, a litigant does not have the
option for a jury. Illustratively, in family violence proceedings' in Family
Court,4 the majority of the fifty states do not permit juries, and such a
right has never been addressed by the United States Supreme Court.
The core premise of this Article proposes that litigants in family
violence proceedings should be afforded the option of a jury trial in the
adjudicatory phase of: (1) civil order of protection proceedings, and (2)
child protective proceedings, particularly those cases involving physical
violence or allegations of domestic violence.
This Article draws upon both the theory of and research on proce-
dural justice holding that litigants often focus on the appearance of
fairness rather than on the actual outcome.5 Thus, when litigants are
1. John Guinther, THE JURY IN AMERICA xiii (Facts on File Publications, 1988). The
right to a trial by jury in criminal cases is enunciated twice in the United States Con-
stitution and has long been considered an essential right. See U.S. CONST. art. III,
§ 2, d. 3; U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The right to a trial by jury in civil cases does not
have the same status in American jurisprudence, in part because it was never incorpo-
rated against the states. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. This Article will not delve into
Seventh Amendment issues, as it does not attempt to argue that a jury trial in Family
Court proceedings is a fundamental or constitutional right.
2. Janet Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The
Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REv. 1083, 1126 (1991); see also
Anne H. Geraghty & Wallace J. Mlyniec, Unified Family Courts: Tempering Enthu-
siasm with Caution, 40 FAM. CT. REv. 435, 439 (2002) ("If we believe[d] that judges
were perfect dispensers of justice, then we would not need a jury system at all.")
3. For the purposes of this Article, the term "family violence" includes what is com-
monly referred to as domestic violence or intimate partner violence, as well as
violence between siblings, parents, children, and other family members. Although the
dynamics of family violence differ when the violence is between intimate partners, as
compared to violence between siblings, children, and parents, the power and control
and the effects of violence are sufficiently similar to discuss both types of violence to-
gether for the purposes of this Article.
4. Other versions of Family Courts may include Probate Courts, Juvenile Courts, or
Dependency Courts.
5. ALLEN E. LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
2 (Plenum Press, 1988); JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, Procedural Justice: A
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 1-3, 121-22 (Lawrence Erlbaum ed., 1975); TOM R. TY-
LER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAw 71-74 (Yale Univ. Press, 1990); Raymond
Paternoster et al., Do Fair Procedures Matter? The Effect of Procedural Justice on Spouse
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able to choose the modality of fact-finding, they may be more accepting
of the legal process, even if the outcome is not favorable to them.6 Al-
lowing the option of a jury, even if not exercised, may dramatically
improve the perceptions of litigants and may affect the legitimacy and
longevity of case outcomes.
Family violence proceedings are particularly poised for the jury trial
option for two main reasons. First, due to the personally consequential
issues being decided in family violence cases and the resulting need for
durable decisions issued with neutrality, litigants' satisfaction with the
legal process is critical. Legitimacy, while indisputably important in all
aspects of law, is especially crucial in the context of family violence mat-
ters, where the litigants are connected to each other by familial ties that
will endure long after the litigation is completed. Hence, the need for
faith in a just and impartial court system for families and children is
7paramount.
Second, in many family violence proceedings the issues are cyclical
and repetitive in nature. Thus, a single jurist has a long-standing role in
adjudicating issues involving the same litigants in numerous proceed-
ings.8 When critical family issues and life-altering decisions are at stake,
even the mere perception of bias can undermine a litigant's faith in the
justice system, the legitimacy of a given decision, and the willingness of
that litigant to comply with that decision.9 Family Court judges hear
cases with some of the most far-reaching consequences in the lives of
litigants. A jury option in family violence cases will enhance the percep-
tion of unbiased decision-making and consequently may improve
compliance with the resulting court orders.
Assault, 31 LAw & Soc'y Rav. 163, 166-71 (1997). A recent analysis of an earlier set
of data showed that an abuser's sense of fair treatment has a statistically significant ef-
fect upon further recidivism. See Deborah Epstein, Procedural Justice: Tempering the
State's Response to Domestic Violence, 43 WM & MARY L. REV. 1843, 1876-80 (2002)
[hereinafter Epstein, Tempering]; Roger K. Warren, Public Trust and Procedural Jus-
tice, 37 CT. Rav. 12, 15 n.10 (2000).
6. LIND & TYLER, supra note 5, at 34-35.
7. "Perceptions of unfair treatment could weaken one's stake in conformity; fair treat-
ment could strengthen it." Epstein, Tempering, supra note 5, at 1878.
8. Geraghty & Mlyniec, supra note 2, at 438-39; Victor Eugene Flango & H. Ted
Rubin, How Is Court Coordination of Family Cases Working?, 33 JUDGE'S J. 10, 15
(1994). Some scholars have argued that this approach can be problematic, because
some judges believe that women ask for orders of protection in order to gain an ad-
vantage in another case. See JAMES PTACEK, BATrERED WOMEN IN THE COURTROOM:
THE POWER OF JUDICIAL RESPONSES 55 (1999) (debunking the myth that victims try
to gain leverage in other cases by asking for orders of protection).
9. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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Throughout this Article, the term survivor will be utilized instead
of victim when referring to those who have been abused, and a broader
definition of family violence will be utilized as explained earlier.'1 This
Article will also refer to the survivor of violence in the female voice with
the male pronoun for the perpetrator. Of course, domestic violence is
prevalent in same-sex partnerships and also includes male survivors of
female abuse." Yet throughout history, and according to actual statistical
data, women have been disproportionately affected by family violence as
survivors and/or as primary caretakers of their children.12
Part I of this Article mentions briefly the federal constitutional
right to a jury in the context of criminal cases and its foundations and
then addresses the evolution of Family Courts across the United States.
It also outlines the arguments both for and against jury trials in Family
Court cases, arguments historically addressed in the context of juvenile
delinquency cases. In addition, Part I delineates those states which actu-
ally permit jury rights in Family Court proceedings. Part II of this
Article considers family violence dynamics in the context of the legal
system and then addresses litigants' notions of fairness on a theoretical
level. Part II focuses exclusively on the right to a jury trial in civil order
10. See supra note 3; see also Edward Gondolf & Ellen Fisher, The Survivor Theory, in
NANCY K.D. LEMON, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAW 80-91 (2d ed., 2001); Bonita C.
Meyersfeld, Reconceptualizing Domestic Violence in International Law, 67 ALB. L. REv.
371,379-80 (2003). For further discussion of labeling survivors of domestic violence
as victims, see Mary A. Lynch, Designing a Hybrid Domestic Violence Prosecution
Clinic: Making Bedfellows of Academics, Activists and Prosecutors to Teach Students Ac-
cording to Clinical Theory and Best Practices, 74 Miss. L.J. 1177, 1197 (2005); see also
Bruce J. Winick, Applying the Law Therapeutically in Domestic Violence Cases, 69
UMKC L. REv. 33, 33 (2000).
11. See Alexander Detschelt, Recognizing Domestic Violence Directed Towards Men:
Overcoming Societal Perceptions, Conducting Accurate Studies, and Enacting Re-
sponsible Legislation, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 249, 249 (2003); see also Carla M.
Da Luz, A Legal and Social Comparison of Heterosexual and Same-Sex Domestic
Violence: Similar Inadequacies in Legal Recognition and Response, 4 S. CAL. REV. L.
& WOMEN'S STUD. 251, 267-72 (1994); Kathleen Finley Duthu, Why Doesn't Any-
one Talk About Gay and Lesbian Domestic Violence?, 18 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 23,
23-24 (1996); Ruthann Robson, Lavender Bruises, 20 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.
567, 567 (1990).
12. Perhaps one could argue that there is inherent discrimination against women and
children by denying juries in those proceedings which affect their lives most. See gen-
erally Annette R. Appell, Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers: Gender, Race, and
Class in the Child Protection System, 48 S.C. L. REV. 577, 584-85 (1997); Gary J.
Maxwell, Women and Children First... Why not Build Enough Lifeboats? News from
the Front: A Report on the Honolulu Conference "Two Systems-One Family, Bringing
the Child Abuse and Domestic Violence Communities Together" (March 23-24, 2000),
10 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 33, 39 n.22 (2000); Kristin L. Taylor, Note, Treating
Male Violence Against Women as a Bias Crime, 76 B.U. L. REV. 575, 588-90 (1996).
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of protection cases and child protective proceedings and does not pro-
pose the right to a jury in custody or other types of Family Court cases.
Finally, Part III examines potential practical obstacles faced as a result of
introducing the right to a jury in family violence proceedings. Ulti-
mately, this Article proposes that a limited jury option be afforded at the
fact-finding stage in two types of family violence cases.
I. THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION AND RESISTANCE TO THE
JURY OPTION IN FAMILY COURT JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Constitutional Right to a Jury in Criminal Cases
The founders of the English law have, with excellent forecast,
contrived that the truth of every accusation, whether preferred
in the shape of indictment, information, or appeal, should af-
terwards be confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of
his equals and neighbors, indifferently chosen and superior to
all suspicion. 3
The notion of a jury dates back to ancient Greek and Roman
times14 and was continued by early British rulers before it was intro-
duced into the American legal system.' 5 Today, the right to a jury is a
quintessential aspect of the United States' justice system 6 and Constitu-
tion. 1'
The jury has been labeled an "inherent and invaluable right,"'" as
well as a "great and inestimable privilege" and entitlement. 9 Juries serve
as mechanisms for educating the public, and at the same time they
13. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 349-50 (Cooley ed.,
1899).
14. See generally Morris B. Hoffman, The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52 DuKE L.J. 951,
956-58 (2003); James B. Thayer, The Jury and Its Development, I., 5 HARv. L. REv.
249, 249-73 (1892); John T. Buckley, Tradition with Deep Roots, N.Y. L. J. 9 (col.
4) (May 2, 2005).
15. See generally Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151-52 (1968); W. FORSYrH, His-
TORY OF TRIAL BY JURY 1-5 (James Appleton Morgan ed., Cockcroft & Company 2d
ed. 1878) (1852); Hoffman, supra note 14, at 958-65; see generally James B. Thayer,
The Jury and Its Development, II., 5 HtAv. L. Rav. 295, 295-319 (1892); James B.
Thayer, TheJury and Its Development, III., 5 H.hv. L. R.Ev. 357, 357-88 (1892).
16. See, e.g., Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149.
17. See supra note 1.
18. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 152.
19. Id.
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"bestow legitimacy upon the adjudicatory process. ' Jurors act as a col-
lective decision-making group" and infuse a fresh perspective into each
case. Despite the long-standing foundations of juries, which have
"weathered criticism and attack, always to survive and to be cherished,, 22
juries have been resisted in the Family Court setting.
B. The History and Overview of the Family Court System
Arguably, some of the most critical, delicate, and weighty legal is-
sues are handled in Family Courts across the nation. In these
courthouses, families' fates and futures are shaped every day. These
Courts decide issues such as whether a child has been abused by a parent
or caretaker; whether a child has been neglected; whether a protective
order should be issued on behalf of one family member against another;
whether a child should be tried as a juvenile or as an adult, and whether
that child's liberty should be curtailed; whether a child is in need of
more supervision than is available at home; whether the child's parents
can be identified, and, if so, what their custodial rights and financial
obligations are to that child; whether a child should live with a parent or
a guardian; whether a permanent plan outside of the home is in the
child's best interests; or whether or not parental ties to a child should be
forever severed.
In 1899, Illinois created the first Juvenile Court in the United
States. 23 The Court was created to provide an ameliorative and non-
structured court system for juvenile delinquents who would otherwise
be charged as adult criminals.24 In 1914 in Ohio, the first official Family
Court was formed, combining both juvenile court and domestic rela-
20. Douglas G. Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury: Comparative Analysis
and Proposalshr Reform, 48 ALA. L. Rav. 441, 470 (1997).
21. LIND & TYLER, supra note 5, at 91-92.
22. See VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 251 (2001).
23. See, e.g., CLEMENS BARTOLLAS, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 12 (Macmillan Publishing
2000); ROBERT M. MENNEL, THORNS & THISTLES: JUVENILE DELINQUENTS IN THE
UNITED STATES 130 (1973); ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVEN-
TION OF DELINQUENCY 101 (1977); Kerrin C. Wolf, Justice By Any Other Name: The
Right to a Jury Trial and the Criminal Nature ofluuvenile Justice in Louisiana, 12 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 275, 278-79 (2003).
24. MENNEL, supra note 23, at 130-32; Emily Buss, The Missed Opportunity in Gault, 70
U. CHI. L. REV. 39, 39-40 (2003); Wolf, supra note 23, at 278-79;.Korine L. Lar-
sen, Comment, With Liberty and Juvenile Justice for Al. Extending the Right to a Jury
trial to the Juvenile Courts, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 836, 841-43 (1994). But see
PLATT, supra note 23, at 36-43 (arguing that the move toward juvenile court was
more about the elite's social control over immigrant and minority youth).
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tions matters.25 Thereafter, a national movement integrated many Juve-
nile and Family Courts as states recognized the intersection between
juvenile delinquency, child dependency, child support, and divorce.
26
By 1925, each state had some type of Juvenile Court, except Maine
and Wyoming.27 Today, every state in the United States has at least one
Juvenile or Family Court,
2 as do almost all industrialized countries.
These courts have different titles, such as Dependency Courts, Family
Courts, Juvenile Courts, Probate Courts, and the like, yet their genesis
and purposes are largely the same; all were created to attend to the
unique nature of childhood and family issues. Some states have a num-
ber of these courts, overlapping in powers, while other states have
merged all child and family related issues into one court.30
Bifurcated proceedings, akin to adjudication and sentencing in
criminal cases, or liability and damages in civil cases, remain a vestige of
many Family Courts today." In New York, for instance, every type of
Family Court proceeding is bifurcated,3 2 with the fact-finding phase pre-
ceding the disposition.3
The Family Courts, initially designed to protect children and fami-
lies rather than to punish,34 eventually expanded their role beyond
25. MENNEL, supra note 23, at 132.
26. MENNEL, supra note 23, at 150; PRESTON ELROD & R. Sco-i-r RYDER, JUVENILE JUS-
TICE: A SOCIAL, HISTORICAL, AND LEGAL PERSPECTWE 236 (1999); Willis B. Perkins,
Family Courts, 17 MICH. L. REv. 378, 378-81 (1919).
27. MENNEL, supra note 23, at 130-32; ELROD & RYDER, supra note 26, at 115.
28. See Ainsworth for a listing of the statutes designating family and juvenile courts in
each state. Ainsworth, supra note 2, at 1083 n.1; see also ELROD & RYDER, supra note
26, at 233.
29. See Ainsworth for a listing of other countries which have family and juvenile court
systems. Ainsworth, supra note 2, at 1084 n.2.
30. See ELROD & RYDER, supra note 26, at 233-34.
31. See generally N.Y. Family Court Act § 111 et seq. (McKinney 2006); In re Snyder,
566 N.W.2d 18, 20 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (acknowledging the "clear bifurcation be-
tween adjudicative trials and dispositional hearings"); In re Oakes, 220 N.W.2d 188,
190 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974) (acknowledging the rule of bifurcation).
32. See N.Y. Family Court Act § 111 etseq.
33. Disposition has been defined as the "final settlement of a matter." In re Rudolph M.,
664 N.Y.S.2d 399, 401 (Fam. Ct. 1997) (citing In re Carmelo E., 57 N.Y.2d 431,
471 (1982)). It addresses the outcome and relief sought by Petitioner. If the factual
basis of a petition has been substantiated, the Court then proceeds to the disposition.
34. The state legislative history in New York, for example, states that its purpose for child
abuse and neglect proceedings is to "protect children from injury or mistreatment
and to help safeguard their physical, mental, and emotional well-being." N.Y. Family
Court Act § 1011. Likewise, New York law codifies that Family Court Orders of Pro-
tection are to be issued to "stop the violence, end the family disruption and obtain
protection," not to mete out punishment. Id. at § 812(2)(b); see also MENNEL, supra
2006]
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parens patriae,35 or substitute parent. The overall tenor of the Juvenile
and Family Courts remained informal and even benevolent; yet over
time this informality garnered criticism. For example, as the United
States Supreme Court noted in In re Gault:
Juvenile Court history has again demonstrated that unbridled
discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a
poor substitute for principle and procedure .... The absence
of substantive standards has not necessarily meant that chil-
dren receive careful, compassionate, individualized treatment.
The absence of procedural rules based upon constitutional
principle has not always produced fair, efficient, and effective
procedures. Departures from established principles of due
process have frequently resulted not in enlightened procedure,
but in arbitrariness.36
Over time, the paternalistic role of Family Courts receded and gave way
to a more formalistic role, as many landmark United States Supreme
Court cases granted parents and juveniles a panoply of procedural and
substantive due process rights 7
C. The Evolution of and Resistance to the Jury Option in Family Court
Perhaps because jury trials invoke notions of punishment, legisla-
tures historically deemed juries inapplicable to Family Courts, as the
note 23, at 130-32; Larsen, supra note 24, at 841-43; Wolf, supra note 23, at 278-
79.
35. Literally, "parent of the country." See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967); MENNEL,
supra note 23, at 130-32; Larsen, supra note 24, at 841-42; Hon. Patrick R. Tamilia,
In Search ofJuvenile Justice: From Star Chamber to Criminal Court, 29 AKRON L. REv.
509, 509 (1996); Frank E. Vandervort & William E. Ladd, The Worst ofAll Possible
Worlds: Michigan " Juvenile Justice System and International Standards for the Treat-
ment of Children, 78 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 203, 211-12 (2001); Wolf, supra note
23, at 278.
36. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 18-19.
37. Although the Supreme Court explicitly did not grant the right to a jury trial in juve-
nile delinquency cases, see McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971), and did
not grant the absolute right to an attorney in a termination of parental rights case, see
Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981), the Court has granted
a number of other rights to parents and juveniles. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972); Pierce v. So-
ciety of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
400 (1923); see also Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 557 (1966); In re Gault,
387 U.S. at 57.
[Vol. 13:1
INTRODUCING THE CONSTRUCT OF THE JURY
purpose of such Courts was treatment, 8 and the safety of children and
families was heralded as the paramount concern."
1. Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings and the Jury
In juvenile delinquency cases, jury trials are much more common
than in any other type of Family Court proceeding in the United States,
yet they are still somewhat rare. The topic of jury trials in juvenile de-
linquency matters has been ably argued by many lawyers, scholars, and
criminologists,0 and this Article will not endeavor to re-argue the issue.
Yet, the arguments for and against jury trials in juvenile delinquency
matters serve as a useful backdrop to analyze whether a right to a jury
option is suitable for family violence proceedings. Juvenile delinquency
cases are quasi-criminal 4 in nature in that the same acts would be con-
sidered crimes if perpetrated by adults.42 Similarly, in civil domestic
38. Ainsworth, supra note 2, at 1101 (citing Commonwealth v. Fisher, 62 A. 198, 200
(Pa. 1905) ("Whether the child deserves to be saved by the state is no more a ques-
tion for a jury than whether the father, if able to save it, ought to save it.")).
39. Today, some domestic violence advocates or child advocates might argue that another
purpose of a family violence proceeding should be to hold the batterer or child abuser
accountable, whether it is through Criminal Court or Family Court. See, e.g., LUNDY
BANCROFT, WHY DOES HE Do THAT? INSIDE THE MINDS OF ANGRY AND CONTROL-
LING MEN 291-313 (G.P. Putnam's Sons 2002); David Adams, Treatment Mode of
Men Who Batter: A Profeminist Analysis, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE
176, 196 (Kersti Yllo & Michele Bograd eds., 1988); Maxwell, supra note 12, at 39.
40. See, e.g., Susan E. Brooks, Juvenile Injustice: The Ban on Jury Trials for Juveniles in the
District of Columbia, 33 U. OF LOUISVILLE J. OF FAM. L. 875, 875 (1994-95); Buss,
supra note 24, at 51; Laura Cohen, Jury Trials in Juvenile Proceedings, 1998 INDIGENT
DEFENSE 8, 8-9 (1998); Martin Guggenheim & Randy Hertz, Reflections on Judges,
Juries, and Justice: Ensuring the Fairness ofluvenile Delinquency Trials, 33 WAKE FOR-
EST L. REV. 553, 556 (1998); Sandra M. Ko, Comment, Why Do They Continue To
Get the Worst of Both Worlds? The Case for Providing Louisiana ' Juveniles With the
Right to a Jury in Delinquency Adjudications, 12 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L.
161, 163-64 (2004); Larsen, supra note 24, at 836; Jaime L. Preciado, The Right to a
Juvenile Jury Trial in Wisconsin: Rebalancing the Balanced Approach, 1999 Wis. L.
REv. 571, 575 (1999); Joseph B. Sanborn Jr., The Right to a PublicJury Trial: A Need
for Todays rJuvenile Court, 76 JUDICATURE 230, 231 (1993); Wolf, supra note 23, at
277-78.
41. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 23-24; see also Justice Ed Kinkeade, Appellate Juvenile Justice
in Texas It's a Crime! Or Should Be, 51 BAYLOR L. REv. 17, 18 (1999) (recognizing
the quasi-criminal nature of juvenile justice proceedings).
42. See Chauncey E. Brummer, Extended Juvenile Jurisdiction: The Best of Both Worlds?,
54 ARK. L. REV. 777, 777-79 (2002); Barry C. Feld, Juvenile and Criminal Justice
Systems'Responses to Youth Violence, 24 CRIME & JUST. 189, 189-90 (1998); Barry C.
Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REv. 691, 692-93
(1991).
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violence cases and child protective cases involving alleged violence, the
cases are predicated upon offenses which, if charged in criminal court,
would be considered crimes.43 The facts and circumstances are often se-
vere with serious outcomes." As Professor Winick states in the context
of therapeutic jurisprudence, "the special repetitive nature of domestic
violence and of the harm it brings warrants separate treatment."45 For
these reasons and others stated in this Article, family violence proceed-
ings are precisely those cases where litigants must maintain faith in the
integrity of a bias-free court system.
Within the context of juvenile delinquency cases, the United States
Supreme Court stated in In re Winship that "civil labels and good inten-
tions do not themselves obviate the need for criminal due process
safeguards in juvenile courts."46 A few years earlier in the landmark case
of In re Gault,47 the Supreme Court afforded many of the constitutional
safeguards and provisions in adult criminal trials to juveniles in delin-
quency proceedings under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.48
With respect to the specific issue of a jury, the Supreme Court held
in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania49 that trial by jury is not constitutionally
required for juveniles, because the Sixth Amendment does not apply to
juvenile proceedings, as such cases are not "criminal prosecution [s]" and
are consequently outside the ambit of the Sixth Amendment. 0 Indeed,
the McKeiver Court was very concerned that juries might irrevocably
alter juvenile court proceedings.5 The Court, holding that the Constitu-
tion does not require jury trials in delinquency proceedings, left the
43. Some courts have even held that the civil legislative label is misplaced in civil order of
protection cases and violations thereof. See People v. Wood, 742 N.E.2d 114, 117
n.3 (N.Y. 2000); People v. Runyon, 195 Misc. 2d 185, 186 (N.Y. App. Term 2002).
44. See, e.g., MIcH. COMP. LAws § 712A.19b(3)(k) (2005); N.Y. Soc. SERV. L. § 384-b
(McKinney 2005); Adoption and Safe Families Act, 42 U.S.C. 670 etseq.
45. Winick, supra note 10, at 37.
46. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365-66 (1970).
47. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 31-59 (1967). Some might argue that the idea of Family
Courts being more therapeutic than adversarial is a theoretical construct alone. In
other words, a benevolent court is no more the reality of Family Courts today than is
Gault's reference to a "kangaroo court." See id. at 28. Family Court is just that-a
court. All of the benefits and all of the downfalls of a judicial system exist therein.
48. The Gault Court found that a number of rights were applicable to juveniles, includ-
ing: the right to notice of the charges, id. at 33; the right to counsel, i at 36; the
privilege against self-incrimination, id. at 55; the rights of confrontation and sworn
testimony of witnesses for cross-examination, id. at 57.
49. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
50. Id. at 541-45.
51. Id. at 547.
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option to the states. Nonetheless, the Court cautioned "[t]here is a
possibility, at least, that the jury trial, if required as a matter of constitu-
tional precept, will remake the juvenile proceeding into a fully adversary
process and will put an effective end to what has been the idealistic
prospect of an intimate, informal protective proceeding."" The Court
also held that "if the jury trial were injected into the juvenile court sys-
tem as a matter of right-it would bring with it into the system the trial
track delay, the formality and the clamor of the adversary system, and
possibly the public trial."54 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Terry
added: "[T]he juvenile court judge would of necessity have to concern
himself much more with the technicalities of proper procedure, and
would have a vastly reduced capacity to guide and mold the hearings.,
55
Some states subsequently implemented a right to a jury trial in ju-
venile delinquency proceedings, but the majority of states did not.56 As
of 2006, fewer than twenty states allow jury trials in juvenile delin-57
quency cases; some of these states only offer the option of a jury in
limited situations.
58
The principal arguments against juries in juvenile delinquency cases
include: (1) the jury will make criminal trials and juvenile trials
synonymous, thereby allowing more stringent punishments;59 (2) the
52. Id.
53. Id. at 545.
54. Id. at 550.
55. In re Terry, 265 A.2d 350, 355-56 (Pa. 1970).
56. Larsen, supra note 24, at 856-57; Sanborn, supra note 40, at 233.
57. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.110 (2004); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 55A
(West 2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A. 17(2) (West 2005); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 32A-2-16 (LexisNexis 2005); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.03 (Vernon 2004);
W. VA. CODE § 49-5-6 (2005); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-223(c) (2004). For statis-
tics from 1998, see Cohen, supra note 40, at 8.
58. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-325 (2005); COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-2-107 (2005);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-509 (2005); 705 ILL. COMp. STAT. 405/5-820 (2005); 705
ILL. COMp. STAT. 405/5-815 (2005); KA. STAT. ANN. § 38-1656 (2005); S.B. 261,
81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1502 (2003); R.I.
GEN. LAws § 14-1-7.3 (2006); In re Jeffrey C., 781 A.2d 4 (N.H. 2001); State v.
Johnson, 574 S.W.2d 739 (Tenn. 1978); State v. Jackson, 503 S.W.2d 185 (Tenn.
1973); Arwood v. State, 463 S.W.2d 943 (Tenn. 1970); Minn. R. Juv. Delinquency
P. 19.09, available at http://www.courts.state.mn.us/rules/juvenile/JUVDEL.doc (last
visited August 27, 2006)). Legislation is pending in Wisconsin as well. H.R. 110,
97th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2005).
59. See David S. Tanenhaus & Steven A. Drizin, "Owing to the Extreme Youth of the Ac-
cused" The Changing Legal Response to Juvenile Homicide, 92 J. CRiM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 641, 646 (2002); Ko, supra note 40, at 175; Sara E. Kropf, Overturning
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania: The Unconstitutionality of Using Prior Convictions to Enhance
Adult Sentences Under the Sentencing Guidelines, 87 GEo. L.J. 2149, 2169-70, 2174
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informality of Family Court will vanish; 60 and (3) these trials should be
private and closed to the public. 6I However, even without the presence
of a jury, juvenile trials have become more formal, while punishments
have become increasingly more severe for juveniles." Notably, this
phenomenon has occurred across the nation and is not limited to just
those states allowing juries. Thus, one cannot conclude that there is an
established causal connection between the introduction of juries in ju-
venile delinquency cases and the concerns initially raised by opponents.
2. Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings and the Jury
Although a rarity, some states afford the right to a jury to parents
facing termination of their parental rights.63 As of 2006, fewer than ten
states allow juries in termination cases. 6' Termination of parental rights
proceedings are often referred to as the Family Court equivalent of the
(1999)(challenging some of the assertions by the McKeiver court in today's juvenile
court system).
60. However, these ideals are not the reality of the current juvenile system. See Kropf,
supra note 59, at 2166-70. There is an impression by some that Juvenile and Family
Courts have relaxed evidentiary standards and relaxed standards of professional con-
duct even though this is not always the case.
61. See Danielle R. Oddo, Removing Confidentiality Protections and the "Get Tough"
Rhetoric: What Has Gone Wrong With the Juvenile Justice System?, 18 B.C. THIaD
WORLD L.J. 105, 111-12 (1998).
62. See Jeffrey A. Butts, Speedy Trial in the Juvenile Court, 23 AM. J. CluM. L. 515, 516-
17 (1996); Cohen, supra note 40, at 8-9; Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 59, at
642-43; John Gibeaut, A Jury Question: Jurors Should Judge Youths in Juvenile Court,
Some Say, 85 A.B.A. J. 24, 24-25 (1999); Larsen, supra note 24, at 845-46; Oddo,
supra note 61, at 113-16; Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, Developmental In-
competence, Due Process, and Juvenile Justice Policy, 83 N.C. L. REv. 793, 805-09
(2005); Wolf, supra note 23, at 275-76.
63. The right to a jury in termination of parental rights proceedings is beyond the scope
of this Article; it is a complex, nuanced topic to be addressed in a future article.
64. Some states with this right include Rhode Island, Texas, Wisconsin, Wyoming, and
Oklahoma. R.I. GEN. LAws § 14-1-47 (2005); TEX. Fam. CODE ANN. § 105.002
(Vernon 2004); Wis. STAT. § 48.31 (2005); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-312 (2004);
Gray v. Upp, 943 P.2d 592 (Okla. 1997); In re D.D.F., 801 P.2d 703 (Okla. 1990);
A.E. v. Okla., 743 P.2d 1041, 1048 (Okla. 1987) ("[P]arental rights are too precious
to be terminated without the full panoply of protections afforded by the Oklahoma
Constitution."); In reJ.M., 858 P.2d 118 (Okla. Civ. App. 1993); In re J.N.F., 116
S.W.3d 426 (Tex. App. 2003); In re K.C., Jr., 23 S.W.3d 604 (Tex. App. 2000);
Alexander v. Russell, 682 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. App. 1984); In re G.P., 679 P.2d 976
(Wyo. 1984). Arizona recently implemented jury trials in termination of parental
rights cases. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-537 (2005). The cases are expedited
through the court system. Alaska had such a bill pending in 2003. See H.R. 17, 23rd
Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2003).
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death penalty,65 and thus an argument could be advanced for a jury op-
tion for parents facing such potential consequences. Notably, child
abuse and neglect cases are often the precursor to termination of paren-
tal rights cases, and thus the right to a jury trial at the abuse and neglect
phase deserves consideration.
Depending upon state law, Family Courts may also adjudicate:
status offenses or incorrigibility cases, child custody and visitation, pa-
ternity, child and spousal support, civil orders of protection, child abuse
and neglect, guardianships, adoptions, and sometimes divorces. Only
66one state, Texas, allows a jury trial in almost all Family Court matters
with few exceptions.67
One could argue that the risks of privacy loss, delay, and
disruption to the family may outweigh the benefits of a jury in some
61Family Court matters, such as proceedings involving divorce,
65. See, Drury v. Lang, 776 P.2d 843, 845 (Nev. 1989) ("[Tlermination of a parent's
rights to her child is tantamount to imposition of a civil death penalty."); Douglas E.
Cressler, Requiring Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt in Parental Rights Termination
Cases, 32 U. LOUISVILLE J. FtA. L. 785, 794 (1994) ("Termination is, quite literally,
the family law equivalent of the death penalty."); Michele R. Forte, Making the Case
for Effective Assistance of Counsel in Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights Proceed-
ings, 28 NOVA L. REV. 193, 193 (2003) (citations omitted).
66. See Tax. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 54.03, 105.002 (Vernon 2005); In re J.N.F., 116
S.W.3d 426; Alexander v. Russell, 682 S.W.2d 370, rev'd on other grounds, 699
S.W.2d 209 (Tex. 1985); Exparte Franklin, 393 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. App. 1965).
67. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 105.002(b). A court cannot submit issues of (A) support
under Chapter 154 or Chapter 159; (B) a specific term or condition of possession of
or access to the child; or (C) any right or duty of a conservator, other than the deter-
mination of which joint managing conservator has the exclusive right to designate the
primary residence of the child under Subdivision (1)(D). Id.
68. This Article will not address matrimonial proceedings, even though issues of family
violence are often raised in such proceedings. For a summary of states allowing juries
in matrimonial proceedings, see Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Right to Jury Trial in
State Court Divorce Proceedings, 56 A.L.R_ 4th 955, § 1(a) (1987 & Supp. 2003).
Nebraska legislation was introduced to allow jury trials in matrimonial and custody
matters, but never passed. 2005 Bill Text NE L.B. 886. In New Jersey, jury trials are
rarely permitted in divorce proceedings unless they are joined with tort claims. See
generally Brennan v. Orban, 678 A.2d 667, 671 (N.J. 1996); Carole Pasternak, Vic-
tims Once Again: The New Jersey Supreme Court's Unwillingness to Provide All Marital
Tort Victims the Right to aJury Trial, 7 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 467, 467-68 (1997)
(acknowledging the ambiguous state of New Jersey law regarding jury trials for mari-
tal tort claims). The issue was brought to the forefront in New Jersey by the
landmark case of Brennan, 678 A.2d 667, which held that the Court must balance
the interest in judicial administration with the need to curtail domestic violence. The
Court held that the linchpin for whether a jury demand can be made is the readiness
of the tort claim to be severed from the divorce claim. The exception to this rule
seems to be a particularized finding when a tort claim is joined with a marital claim,
and the Court finds that society has a strong interest in vindicating the marital tort
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incorrigibility," paternity,70 or custody. Similarly, one could argue that
child support proceedings are primarily statutorily driven and complex,
and thus unsuitable for a jury."
The benefits of juries may outweigh the obstacles in childprotec-
tive and civil order of protection proceedings, however, due to the
unique characteristics of family violence proceedings. As of 2006, fewer
than ten states permit the right to a jury trial in child abuse or neglect
proceedings pursuant to a state statute or a state constitution.72 Michi-
gan, for example, has offered a jury trial option in the adjudicative
via a jury trial. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that such cases would benefit
from having one judge decide all issues, even if this could be burdensome. In his dis-
senting opinion, Justice Stein opined that a jury trial should be allowed in all marital
tort claims with a separate jury trial and a different judge on the divorce claim. See
Brennan, 678 A.2d at 680. Some scholars have argued that the majority should have
adopted Justice Stein's reasoning. See, e.g., Pasternak, supra, at 492-93.
69. For example, in a status offense proceeding, a parent is often filing a petition against
his or her own child. Perhaps a jury for this type of case would so invade a family's
privacy and so destroy the relationship between parent and child that the harm would
outweigh the benefit of a jury.
70. In a paternity proceeding, testimony is needed about the mother's sexual history: who
has had "access" to her sexually, how often, how many partners. Again, this is highly
private information, which arguably should not be revealed to a jury. Perhaps if a pa-
ternity proceeding might result in statutory rape or other criminal charges, a right to
counsel and a right to a jury would be appropriate. Some states indeed have jury trials
for paternity or "bastardy" proceedings. See generally David M. Holliday, Annotation,
Paternity Proceedings.- Right to Jury Trial, 51 A.L.R. 4th 565, § 2(a) (1987 & Supp.
2002) (summarizing the law in several jurisdictions regarding the right to a jury trial
in paternity proceedings). See also NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-1412 (2004) (providing jury
trial upon request by the alleged father or the mother); Wis. Star. § 767.50 (2006)
(providing jury trial upon request by defendant); B.J.Y. v. M.A., 617 So.2d 1061
(Fla. 1993); Pruitt v. Pruitt, 282 N.W.2d 785, 787 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979); Oregon,
State ex rel. Jones v. Workman, 579 P.2d 1302 (Or. Ct. App. 1978).
71. The federal Family Support Act mandates that each state "must establish guidelines
for child support award amounts within the State." Family Support Act of 1988, 42
U.S.C. § 667 (2005). Georgia recently enacted a statute which allows jury trials in
child support modification cases. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-6-19 (2005) (effective Jan. 1,
2007). New York has attempted similar legislation in child support proceedings, but
no legislation has passed to date. See A.B. 6670, 2005, Leg., 228th Sess. (N.Y. 2005).
72. See generally James L. Buchwalter, Annotation, Right to Jury Trial in Child Neglect,
Child Abuse, or Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings, 102 A.L.R. 5th 227,
§ 1(a) (2002 & Supp. 2003) (summarizing the law in several jurisdictions regarding
the right to a jury trial in neglect, abuse and termination of parental rights proceed-
ings); see, e.g., COLO. Rav. STAT. § 19-3-202 (2006); MIcH. COMp. LAws § 712A. 17
(2006); R.I. GEN. L4ws § 14-1-47 (2004 & Supp. 2005); Tax. FAMILY CODE ANN.
§ 105.002 (2006); Wisc. STAT. § 48.31 (2006); Wisc. STAT. § 48.30 (2006); Wisc.
STAT. § 48.243 (2006); Wyo. STAT. § 14-3-423 (2006). Different states may term
child protective proceedings as dependency, shelter, deprivation, child abuse or ne-
glect proceedings, and the like.
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portion of child abuse and neglect proceedings for decades.73 In states
which provide this option, the right to a jury trial typically applies to the
fact-finding phase of the child protective proceeding, not to the disposi-
tional phase,74 which is the paradigm proposed in this Article.
II. AFFORDING LITIGANTS A JURY IN FAMILY VIOLENCE PROCEEDINGS
Some scholars have wryly noted that "American law has always ex-
hibited a distrust of the judges and has given the jury wide powers to
decide criminal cases. The law, however, has distrusted the jury as much
as the judges."75 Considering the inherent uncertainty in the fact-finding
process, whether by a judge or by jury, the option of choosing a fact-
finder may lend credibility and legitimacy to the legal system, thereby
encouraging compliance with court orders.76 Furthermore, the option to
select a modality of fact-finding might well facilitate greater respect for
the law, resulting in fairer resolutions that are more likely to endure over
time without being sabotaged by the litigants.77
A. The Dynamics of Family Violence and Corresponding Proceedings
Once violence permeates a family and progresses to a court case,
the stakes are higher for the survivor,7s the perpetrator, and the children.
73. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.17(2) (West 2005 & Supp. 2006); In re Hubel,
384 N.W.2d 849 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986); In re Mathers, 124 N.W.2d 878 (Mich.
1963).
74. See, e.g., MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 712A.17(2); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 105.002
(Vernon 2005 & Supp. 2006); R.I. GEN. LAws § 14-1-47 (2004 & Supp. 2005); In
re K.S., 807 P.2d 292 (Okla. Civ. App. 1990); Exparte Franklin, 393 S.W.2d 632
(Tex. App. 1965).
75. Irwin A. Horowitz & Thomas E. Willging, Changing Views ofJury Power: The Nulli-
fication Debate, 1787-1988, 15 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 165, 166 (1991) (explaining
this to be the case especially in light of jury nullification). But see LIND & TYLER, su-
pra note 5, at 91 (citing MacCoun & Tyler studies, which find that juries, albeit
more cosdy, are perceived as fairer and more accurate than judges).
76. See Tyler, supra note 5, at 64-65; Epstein, Tempering, supra note 5, at 1846.
77. See Epstein, Tempering, supra note 5, at 1846 ("Researchers evaluating why people
obey the law have found that the manner in which an official directive is reached has
an independent, and often more powerful, effect than does the outcome of the direc-
tive itself."); see also TYLER, supra note 5, at 64-65. See generally LIND & TYLER, supra
note 5, at 130-41 (citing Leventhal study).
78. See Deborah Epstein et al., Prioritizing Victims'Long-Term Safety in the Prosecution of
Domestic Violence Cases, 11 Am. U.J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 465, 473 (2003)
[hereinafter, Epstein, Prioritizing]; Deborah M. Goelman, Shelter fiom the Storm: Us-
ing Jurisdictional Statutes to Protect Victims of Domestic Violence after the Violence
2006]
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Reunification is not always the goal for the family when physical vio-
lence is ongoing or severe."
Family violence cases are among the most delicate and critical of
proceedings; such cases do not always fit within a neat legal rubric. The
latter point was reflected aptly in the words of New York State Chief
Judge Judith S. Kaye in the well-known decision of Nicholson v. Scop-
petta.8 There, the Court "recogniz[ed] that in the inordinately complex
human dilemma presented by domestic violence involving children, the
law may be easier to state than to apply."8
Abusers perpetrate violence against survivors as part of a coercive
pattern of power and control.82 Physical violence, when present, is often
coupled with emotional, financial, sexual, psychological, and other types
of abuse.83 Survivors of family violence do not always identify themselves
as victims of crime; at times, survivors equivocate about whether or
when to leave the abuser.84 There are a number of theories and explana-
tions as to why survivors in intimate partner violent relationships do not
Against Women Act of 2000, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 101, 107-8 (2004); Linell
A. Letendre, Beating Again and Again and Again: Why Washington Needs a New Rule
of Evidence Admitting Prior Acts of Domestic Violence, 75 WASH. L. REv. 973, 979
(2000); Myrna S. Raeder, Proving the Case: Battered Woman and Batterer Syndrome:
The Double-Edged Sword- Admissibility of Battered Woman Syndrome By and Against
Batterers in Cases Implicating Domestic Violence, 67 U. COLO. L. REv. 789, 792-95
(1996).
79. Serious or repeated physical abuse is often the basis for immediate termination of
parental rights. See Adoption and Safe Families Act, 42 U.S.C. 670 et seq. (requiring
states to pursue immediate termination on these grounds in order to obtain federal
funding).
80. Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 3 N.Y.3d 357, 367 n.5 (2004).
81. Id.
82. See generally BANCROFT, supra note 39, at 49-75; DAWN BRADLEY BERRY, THE Do-
MESTIC VIOLENCE SOURCEBOOK 31-32 (Lowell House 3d ed. 2000) (1995); Duluth
Domestic Abuse Intervention Project, Power and Control, http://www.duluth-
model.org (last visited Aug. 27, 2006); Goelman, supra note 78, at 107; Cheryl
Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Prose-
cutions, 109 HARv. L. REv. 1849, 1883 (1996); Joan S. Meier, Domestic Violence,
Child Custody, and Child Protection: Understanding Judicial Resistance and Imagining
the Solutions, 11 Am. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 657, 696 (2003); Deborah
Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering: A Call to Criminalize
Domestic Violence, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 959, 963-64 (2004); Deborah M.
Weissman, Gender-Based Violence as Judicial Anomaly: Between "The Truly National
and the Truly Local" 42 B.C. L. REv. 1081, 1121 (2001).
83. See LUNDY BANCROFT & JAY G. SILVERMAN, THE BATTERER AS PARENT: ADDRESSING
THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON FAMILY DYNAMICS 1, 3 (2002); Duluth
Domestic Abuse Intervention Project, supra note 82; BANCROFT, supra note 39, at 8-
9; BERRY, supra note 82, at 3-4; Meier, supra note 82, at 691-92; Meyersfeld, supra
note 10, at 378.
84. BANCROFT, supra note 39, at 222-23; Meier, supra note 82, at 684.
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leave, and why it may take a survivor multiple attempts before he or she
actually severs the abusive relationship.85
Other unique characteristics of family violence cases include the
phenomenon that violent incidents often occur without eyewitnesses86
and often without subsequent police or medical assistance.87 When there
is a witness, it may be a child, who may also be a victim.88 Abusers may
prevent their victims from receiving medical treatment or insist that
their victims disguise their injuries.89
Because family violence proceedings often span the course of
months, even years, and because the cases are often entrenched in the
Family Court system, judges have an opportunity to observe the de-
meanor and behavior of each litigant over time. Judges see litigants
under tense and artificial circumstances, as litigants appearing in court
85. The dynamics of family violence are incredibly intricate, nuanced and complicated,
and certainly cannot be described with any sort of fullness or adequacy in a single ar-
ticle. That being said, "[b] attered women in the United States typically make 2.4 to 5
attempts to leave their abusers before they ultimately succeed." Leslye E. Orloff &
Janice V. Kaguyutan, Offering a Helping Hand: Legal Protections for Battered Immi-
grant Women: A History of Legislative Responses, 10 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L.
95, 122 (2001) (citing Lewis Okun, Termination or Resumption of Cohabitation of
Women in Battering Relationships: A Statistical Study, in COPING WITH FAMILY Vio-
LENCE: RESEARCH AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES 107, 113 (Gerald T. Hotaling et al.
eds., 1988)); see also Leonore M.J. Simon, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Approach to the
Legal Processing of Domestic Violence Cases, in LAw IN A THERAPEUTnC KEY 243, 262-
65 (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1996).
86. See generally BANCROFT, supra note 39, at 294; Lisa Marie De Sanctis, Bridging the
Gap Between the Rules of Evidence and Justice for Victims of Domestic Violence, 8 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 359, 370-71 (1996); Victoria L. Lutz & Cara M. Bonomolo, My
Husband Just Trashed Our Home: What Do You Mean That's Not a Crime?, 48 S.C. L.
REv. 641, 654 (1997); Pamela Posch, The Negative Effects of Expert Testimony on the
Battered Women's Syndrome, 6 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 485, 499 (1998).
87. See Ira Mark Ellman & Sharon Lohr, Marriage as Contract, Opportunistic Violence,
and Other Bad Arguments for Fault Divorce, 1997 U. ILL. L. REv. 719, 763 (1997);
Laura J. Hickman & Sally S. Simpson, Fair Treatment or Preferred Outcome? The Im-
pact of Police Behavior on Victim Reports of Domestic Violence Incidents, 37 LAw &
Soc'Y REv. 607, 608 (2003) ("Whatever the actual rate of official reporting, it is clear
that large numbers of victims continue to refrain from seeking the assistance of the
police when they are assaulted by a present or former sexual intimate."); Katherine
M. Schelong, Domestic Violence and the State: Responses to and Rationales for Spousal
Battering, Marital Rape &Stalking, 78 MARQ. L. REv. 79, 98 (1994).
88. See generally BANCROFT, supra note 39, at 8, 293; Justine A. Dunlap, Symposium,
The "Pitiless Double Abuse" of Battered Mothers, 11 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L.
523, 524 (2003); Lynne R. Kurtz, Protecting New York's Children: An Argument for
the Creation of a Rebuttable Presumption Against Awarding a Spouse Abuser Custody of
a Child, 60 ALB. L. REv. 1345, 1345 (1997); Lillian Wan, Parents Killing Parents:
Creating a Presumption of Unfitness, 63 ALB. L. REv. 333, 344 (1999).
89. See Schelong, supra note 87, at 98; De Sanctis, supra note 86, at 371; Epstein, Priori-
tizing, supra note 78, at 473.
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are often frustrated, frightened, or anxious. Litigants may react to stress
while in the courthouse hallways, or even inside the courtroom itself,
and thus may unduly influence a judge's assessment of them. In the do-
mestic violence context, a survivor may appear nervous and frantic,
particularly if she is facing her batterer in court.9° Moreover, psychologi-
cally traumatized litigants may present themselves as non-credible.9
Conversely, batterers often present themselves remarkably well in court
and while interacting with law enforcement.92
It is not uncommon for a survivor to file a complaint and then
withdraw it, only to file again shortly thereafter," which then may nega-
tively impact the credibility of the litigant in the eyes of a judge. During
the multiple appearances and adjournments on a specific case, when
stress levels are high and testimony is not being elicited, the judge may
not obtain an accurate image of the parties." In such a circumstance, a
trial judge already has a well-formed impression of the parties and fami-
lies.95 Yet, this same judge will determine not only the facts of the case
and the credibility of the witnesses, but also issue the ultimate disposi-
tion regarding the family.96
It is the intimate relationships among the litigants, coupled with
the long-term involvement of the Family Court's original mandate to
treat rather than to punish, that creates the opportunity for one jurist to
resolve all questions of fact and decide all questions of law. Thus, a par-
90. See David Adams, Identifying the Assaultive Husband in Court: You Be the Judge, 33
BOSTON B.J. 23, 23 (1989) (stating that the woman frequently appears hysterical, but
the abuser appears composed, resulting in courts and police believing that the woman
is embellishing her story); Meier, supra note 82, at 691-92.
91. See generally Meier, supra note 82, at 690-92.
92. See BANCROFT, supra note 39, at 291-313; Hanna, supra note 82, at 1878 (stating
that judges identify with batterers who present themselves as "charming, respectful,
and persuasive"); Kathleen Waits, Battered Women and their Children: Lessons from
One Woman's Story, 35 Hous. L. REv. 29, 54 (1998); Meier, supra note 82, at 690-
92.
93. See BANCROFT, supra note 39, at 303-05; BERRY, supra note 82, at 161-62.
94. This is not dissimilar to law enforcement responding to the scene of domestic vio-
lence crimes repeatedly. After so many times, even well-trained judges and law
enforcement officials may eventually stop believing the victim's accounts of violence
and control by the batterer. See Hanna, supra note 82, at 1878. Domestic violence
survivors do not always present well and may have secondary trauma, such as
alcohol/drug abuse, or mental illness, often a consequence of the violence itself. See
Epstein, Prioritizing, supra note 78, at 473-77; Epstein, Tempering, supra note 5, at
1861; Meier, supra note 82, at 691-92.
95. In Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 786 n.1 2 (1982), the late Justice Rehnquist
utilized the phrase "steeped in" to indicate the level of involvement Family Court
judges have with some litigants.
96. Judges perform dual roles as fact-finders and sentencers. Ainsworth, supra note 2, at
1124-25.
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ent or party who does not fare well in a court proceeding may question
the objectivity of having only one person decide all questions of fact and
law.
97
Checks and balances must be an integral part of the Family Courts
to discourage the appearance of impropriety or unbridled discretion. 9
The appearance of legitimacy and neutrality is critical in cases involving
the ever-changing lives of families and the need to achieve permanence
and safety. Indeed, if the rehabilitative goals of the Family Court are to
be realized, it is crucial to address the state of mind of the litigants and
their perceptions of a bias-free result.
B. Litigants'Notions of Fairness in Family Violence Proceedings
There are a number of ways in which litigants involved in family
violence cases might perceive bias on the part of the judges and lawyers
involved in their cases. This section focuses on three areas in which bias
may be routinely perceived: (1) on an institutional level; (2) on a per-
sonal level; and (3) from the perspective that a single jurist is privy to
too much information.
Survivors of domestic violence often state that they feel abused by
"the system"-referring to the law enforcement system, the court sys-
tem, or both.99 In fact, some survivors believe that they are more able to
predict the abuse perpetrated by their batterers than to face the uncer-
tainty of the court system.'00 Stated differently, some survivors of
97. See, e.g., Geraghty & Mlyniec, supra note 2, at 438-39.
98. See, e.g., Mary McDevitt Gofen, The Right ofAccess to Child Custody and Dependency
Cases, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 857, 857 (1995) (suggesting that access to Family Court
cases provides a check on the parties and system involved).
99. See BANCROFT, supra note 39, at 291-313; PTACEK, supra note 8, at 150-51 (1999)
("Three dimensions of fear have been presented as important to women's court ap-
pearances-fear of the defendant, intimidation produced by the institutional setting,
and fear of being treated unjustly by the judge.... [I]n some cases judges' responses
amounted to a secondary traumatization."); Epstein, Prioritizing, supra note 78, at
468-69; Cheryl Hanna, The Paradox of Hope: The Crime and Punishment of Domestic
Violence, 39 Wm. & MARY L. Rav. 1505, 1551-52 (1998); Linda G. Mills, Killing
Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the Violence of State Intervention, 113 HARv. L. REv.
550, 553-55 (1999); Prentice L. White, Stopping the Chronic Batterer Through Legis-
lation: Will It Work This Time?, 31 PEPP. L. REv. 709, 726-27 (2004).
100. See generally Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 3 N.Y.3d 357, 371 (2004); BANCROFT, supra
note 39, at 291-313; Ruth Jones, Guardianship for Coercively Controlled Battered
Women: Breaking the Control of the Abuser, 88 GEO. L.J. 605, 627 (2000); Meier, su-
pra note 82, at 665-67; Waits, supra note 92, at 31 ("[B]attered women are often
victimized a second time by police, prosecutors, lawyers, psychologists, and judges");
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violence feel better equipped to withstand the familiar abuse of their
batterers, rather than face what they perceive as abuse by a court process
with which they are unfamiliar. Additionally, a survivor who does not
perceive justice in the courtroom may not access the Family Court sys-
tem in the future.
1'0
Affording litigants the option of a jury trial may enhance the confi-
dence those litigants have in the judicial system. In a family violence
proceeding, a litigant may believe that a jury-bringing the composite
experiences of twelve people to the case-will inject a more human ele-
ment than would only one finder of fact. Many survivors of violence feel
empowered when able to tell their stories and have their voices heard,
voices which for so long have been silenced by their abusers. Perhaps a
survivor of family violence will view a jury as a more welcoming forum
in this regard. Furthermore, a jury might foster a non-formulaic
approach to cases that are unique and complex. Petitioners for civil or-
ders of protection might select a jury option for some of the reasons
stated above, and also might re-engage the Family Courts in the future.
Similarly and consistent with procedural justice theories, if an ac-
cused abuser has the option of having his fate decided by strangers
instead of a judge who knows him from prior court proceedings, he
might be more likely to comply with the resultant orders.10 2 Scholars and
researchers have advocated for procedural justice concepts in domestic
violence cases on the theory and data that batterers more readily comply
with orders rendered if the orders are fashioned in a bias-free manner."'
Some have posited with accompanying data that "treating defendants
with neutrality, respect, and consistency is solidly grounded .... If such
treatment also improves compliance, however, it is of special importance
to intimate partner abuse cases, where repetitive, escalating violence is a
predictable scenario for most victims. In the intimate partner vio-
lence context, an abuser may increase violence or re-victimize his or her
partner following an encounter with the court system.' °5 Even further,
Lisa E. Martin, Comment, Providing Equal Justice for the Domestic Violence Victim:
Due Process and the Victim "s Right to Counsel, 34 GONz. L. REv. 329, 346 (1998/99).
101. Epstein, Prioritizing, supra note 78, at 468-69; see also Arlene N. Weisz, LegalAdvo-
caty for Domestic Violence Survivors: The Power of an Informative Relationship, 80
FAMILIES IN SOC'Y 138, 138-47 (1999).
102. Winick, supra note 10, at 42-43 (advocating for therapeutic jurisprudence for a bat-
terer so that he will not perceive rehabilitation as judicially coerced and then may
voluntarily comply). See generally Paternoster, supra note 5, at 165-66; Simon, supra
note 85, at 243-85.
103. See, e.g., Paternoster, supra note 5, at 166-71.
104. Epstein, Tempering, supra note 5, at 1847.
105. Epstein, Prioritizing, supra note 78, at 467-68.
[Vol. 13:1
INTRODUCING THE CONSTRUCT OF THE JURY
litigants "might become more clever in breaking [such] laws if [] con-
vinced that the system used unfair procedures.
'' P
In the child abuse and neglect context, parents may find that the
jury serves as a check and balance to the governmental agency proceed-
ing against them. 10 7 Thus, the resultant court orders may be viewed as
workable instead of coerced. When the state removes a child from a
family due to child abuse or neglect, the agency typically furnishes a case
plan which allows parents to take further actions to reunify the family.
Parental compliance with such case plans seems more likely if parents
perceive a fair and bias-free trial.08 Indeed, as Professor Schepard notes,
"A violent parent is more likely to comply with a court order imposing
restraints on his or her relationship with the child if the court makes an
effort to ensure that the offender perceives the process that resulted in
the order as fair."'0 9 Other authors have opined that proceedings involv-
ing children must "not only be fair but also be so perceived by the
contestants ... because violence and/or child snatching may well ensue
without it.""0 Procedural justice scholars have also argued that the per-
ception of fairness by both the child and the parent could very well lead
to finality and even full acceptance of a permanent order."'
106. LIND & TYLER, supra note 5, at 83. Although the authors were discussing this pros-
pect in the context of traffic laws, their data demonstrate that one can easily analogize
to other areas of law. See, e.g., id. at 79 (citing a Friedland, Thibaut and Walker study
which showed that persons were more "clever lawbreakers" if unfair procedures were
utilized); see also Epstein, Tempering, supra note 5, at 1901. As Lind & Tyler caution,
however, there are many other factors which play into obedience and compliance
with the law.
107. See generally Lyons v. Wickhorst, 42 Cal. 3d 911, 920 (1986) (Bird, C.J., concur-
ring); see also Jackie Gardina, Compromising Liberty: A Structural Critique of the
Sentencing Guidelines, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 345, 347 (2005) (acknowledging
that juries act as checks and balances on court proceedings).
108. I thank David Lansner, Esq., for this insight; see also LIND & TYLER, supra note 5, at
64-65.
109. Andrew I. Schepard, Children, Courts, and Custody: Interdisciplinary Models for
Divorcing Families 86 (2004).
110. Gofen, supra note 98, at 876 n.120, (citing JAMES C. BLACK & DONALD J. CANTOR,
CHILD CUSTODY 51 (1989)); see also K.M. Kitzmann & R.E. Emery, Procedural Jus-
tice and Parents' Satisfaction In a Field Study of Child Custody Dispute Resolution, 17 L.
AND HUM. BEHAV. 553, 554-56, 564 (1993). Although the above authors discuss
fairness in the context of custody disputes, this reasoning can readily be analogized to
family violence proceedings.
111. Gary B. Melton & E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice in Family Court: Does the Adversary
ModelMake Sense?, 5 LEGAL REFORMS AFFECTING CHILD & YOUTH SERVICES 65, 74, 76
(1982) (explaining also that "the child can feel that he or she had a 'day in court' and
that the ultimate decision was made by a third party rather than the parent").
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1. Perceptions of Institutional Bias in the Bench and Bar
In any large metropolitan area in the United States, Family Court
judges are understaffed and overburdened with hundreds of emotionally
charged cases in any given week."2 Thus, some judges may be less jarred
by recounts of violence, child neglect, or criminal activity after hearing
such issues repeatedly. A backdrop of jaded skepticism may permeate the
courtroom, and violence may not resonate to the same degree to a fact-
finder who has heard "the same story" before." 3 Like the lawyers and
social workers who work in the field of family law, Family Court judges
are prone to vicarious traumatization"' and anesthetized empathy result-
ing naturally from constant exposure to descriptions of violence.
Jurors in domestic violence cases and child welfare cases involving
physical violence may serve to relieve an overburdened judge experiencing
vicarious traumatization. As Professor Ptacek noted after interviewing
judges who presided over family violence cases in the state of Massachu-
setts, "[e]mpathetic engagement with women who are suffering from
terrorizing violence can be exhausting,"" 5 and "the emotional cost to
judges who genuinely engage with women seeking protection may be one




Undoubtedly, jurors can also be vicariously traumatized by hearing ac-
counts of violence, yet jurors do not regularly decide hundreds of cases.
Another argument for juries advanced by judges and academics is
that "jury trials should be favored over bench trials because judges can
shield jurors from inadmissible information in ways that they cannot
shield themselves.."".7 Indeed, in criminal cases, judges often know about
112. See PTACEK, supra note 8, at 126-27; DOUGLAS ABRAMS & SARAH RAMSEY, CHILDREN
AND THE LAw: DOCTRINE, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 12 (2003).
113. See generally Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 40, at 574-75.
114. See JEAN KOH PETERS, REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN CHILD PROTECTIVE PROCEED-
INGS: ETHICAL AND PRACTICAL DIMENSIONS 25-69 (1997)(Supp. 2001); see also
Charles R. Figley, Compassion Fatigue as Secondary Traumatic Stress Disorder: An
Overview, in COMPASSION FATIGUE: SECONDARY TRAUMAIC STRESS DISORDERS IN
THOSE WHO TREAT THE TRAUMATIZED 1 (Charles R. Figley ed., 1995); Geraghty &
Mlyniec, supra note 2, at 440; PTACEK, supra note 8, at 126.
115. PTACEK, supra note 8, at 126; see also ROBERT E. KEETON, JUDGING 3 (1990).
116. PTACEK, supra note 8, at 134. Ptacek further states that some judges might be
tempted to "abandon the burden of vicarious traumatization and turn against women
who have been victimized." Id. at 127.
117. Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore Inad-
missible Infbrmation? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REv.
1251, 1259 (2005); see also In re Jose L., 64 A.D.2d 598, 599 (1978) (stating in a
dissenting opinion that "[n]o juror would be permitted to sit with regard to a defen-
dant whom he had previously judged in another criminal case").
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prior convictions that are not allowed to be heard by a jury."' There are
times when the "jury is deciding a case which has n facts and the judge
is deciding a case which has n+1 facts." . 9 The issue of knowing more
facts than are applicable to a specific proceeding may lead some judges
to articulate a preference for juries in order to insulate themselves from
accusations of bias.
20
Litigants might believe that a judge is influenced by his or her own
prior cases, and thus will not give due consideration to the litigant's
pending case. It is human nature to compare and contrast cases from the
previous day or year 12 and perhaps make determinations about which
cases involve "real" violence. Drawing again from the rich literature of
procedural justice theory, "[flew would doubt that the objective fairness
of a procedure is enhanced if the procedure reduces the effects of bias or
prejudice arising from factors irrelevant to the decision at hand.' ' 22 In
the mindset of the litigants, it may be impossible for a single jurist to
purge her mind of previously formed impressions of the litigants,
witnesses, and their families, especially if they have appeared before this
same trier of fact in other proceedings.
123
Furthermore, how and what a lawyer argues in one case, or whether
a lawyer raises a controversial policy concern, may affect all future
cases.22 The institutional nature of courts such as Family Courts
118. See, e.g., HARRY KALVEN, JR & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 127-31 (1966).
119. Id. at 121; see also Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 40, at 572 (stating that inadmis-
sible information "may reach the judge as a result of off-hand remarks by a clerk or
bailiff in the judge's presence or as a result of the judge's review of the court file");
Meier, supra note 83, at 677; Joseph B. Sanborn Jr., Second-Class Justice, First-Class
Punishment: The Use ofJuvenile Records in Sentencing Adults, 81 JUDICATURE 206, 212
(1998).
120. For this insight, I thank Judge Betsy Lambert Peterson, Trinidad & Tobago, who
suggested this possibility at the ISFL conference. Judges might also be concerned that
litigants or the general public perceive that the judge acted improperly, even if un-
true. See also infra note 147.
121. Geraghty & Mlyniec, supra note 2, at 439-40.
122. LIND & TYLER, supra note 5, at 20.
123. As Judge Cooke held in the 1979 New York case of In re Leon RR., 48 N.Y.2d 117,
122 (1979), allowing in inadmissible evidence "raises a substantial probability of ir-
reparable prejudice to a party's case for there is simply no way of gauging the subtle
impact of inadmissible hearsay on even the most objective trier of fact." Interestingly,
and highlighting the need for a fairly perceived justice system, Arizona introduced a
bill under which parents may request a different judge to preside over termination of
parental rights cases if the right to a jury is limited. See HB 2559, 47th Leg., 2d Reg.
Sess. (Az. 2006).
124. This is the subject of the author's work-in-progress, Making Waves or Keeping the
Calm: Institutional Lawyering in the Clinical Legal Education Context. See generally
Martin Guggenheim, Divided Loyalties: Musings on Some Ethical Dilemmas for the In-
stitutional Criminal Defense Attorney, 14 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 13, 13-21
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crystallizes when the same lawyers and the same judges meet day after
day. Such institutional lawyers have been termed by Professor Marc Gal-
anter as "repeat players." '25 The influx of many repeat players creates an
atmosphere and culture in the Family Court that may contribute to a
predetermined mindset and myopic decision-making rather than to a
fresh and objective approach to new cases. 26
Hence, litigants may have concerns not only about the objectivity
of the bench, but also about the lawyers involved in the cases, including
the agency lawyer pursuing the case or the lawyer representing the
child.27 A jury option has the potential to curb concerns of bias or insti-
tutional lawyering by disenfranchised litigants, 28 thereby minimizing
the perception that the bench and the bar are operating hand-in-hand.
2. Perceptions of Value and Identity Bias: A Jury of One's Peers
To achieve public confidence in a court system, intangible issues,
such as litigants' perceptions of judges and juries, must be afforded
weighty consideration. At times, a litigant may perceive a disparity or
divide between his or her own value system or identity and that of the
judge. For example, a litigant who is of color or of low socio-economic
status, or who is transgendered, or an atheist, may make assumptions
that a particular judge represents a more traditional or conservative so-
cietal viewpoint. This disenfranchisement may occur regardless of the
judge's actual views of the litigant or similarly situated litigants.
(1986); see also Melissa Breger, Gina Calabrese and Theresa Hughes, Teaching Profes-
sionalism in Context: Insights fom Students, Clients, Adversaries and Judges, 55 S.C. L.
REv. 303, 338 (2003); Kim Taylor-Thompson, Individual Actor v. Institutional
Player: Alternating Visions of the Public Defender, 84 GEO. L. J. 2419, 2425 (1996).
125. Galanter utilizes the term "repeat players" in his scholarship and distinguishes from
the term "one shotters" to describe lawyers who may have a single case in a particular
courthouse and are not regulars in that courthouse. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves"
Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'y REV. 95,
97(1974).
126. For further discussion of the concept of Groupthink, see generally Christopher Neck
& Gregory Moorhead, Groupthink Remodeled: The Importance of Leadership, Time
Pressure, and Methodical Decision-Making Procedures, 48 HUM. REL. 537, 537-57
(1995).
127. See generally Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 40, at 571-75; Cohen, supra note 40,
at 8.
128. On a more theoretical note, some have argued that when judges rather than juries
"decide custody and dependency cases, the parents are not able to appeal to the
community conscience, as embodied in the jury, to protect against government op-
pression." Gofen, supra note 98, at 877.
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I A litigant might believe, albeit mistakenly, that a privileged judge is
unqualified to act as a jurist making decisions about cases riddled with
poverty, lack of opportunity, and violence-all circumstances which the
judge has perhaps never personally experienced in his or her own life. A
litigant might prefer a jury of one's peers in terms of class, race, religion,
exposure to intimate partner violence, or the like.129 As Professor Ains-
worth aptly states, "jury pools include men and women, blacks and
whites, [and thereby] add valued dimension to jury fact-finding that
judges cannot share."
1 30
The class, race, and background of a given judge or juror are, of
course, not always proxies to core beliefs or the resultant decision-
making."' Nonetheless, a litigant may believe that like-minded or
similarly situated jurors may be more empathetic to his or her case.
Some sociologists would argue that bias is part of human nature,132
yet judges are expected to transcend such internal biases.'33 Six or twelve
129. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), and its progeny highlight the issues about
the racial component of a jury and the essence of fairness in a jury room. The same
can be said about the racial composition of the judiciary. "Inclusion of these groups
[women & minorities] is vital in maintaining and even increasing the legitimacy of
the nation's judicial tribunals .... The presence of political minorities in the U.S. ju-
diciary provides enormous symbolic, and perhaps political, import to a vital branch
of government." Mark S. Hurwitz & Drew Noble Lanier, Women and Minorities on
State and Federal Appellate Benches: A Cross-Time Comparison, 1985 and 1999, 85
JUDICATURE 84, 85 (2001). Some research has shown that juries are not sympathetic
to victims of rape or spousal assault charges, while other data shows jurors are more
sympathetic. Recent research shows these fluctuations may change as juror pools in-
clude more women. See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 22, at 153, 205. But see Kim
Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes injuy Deliberations, 113 HARV. L. REv. 1261, 1262
(2000) (noting that despite the Batson Court's efforts to diversify jury pools, "the
complexion and composition of juries have barely changed").
130. Ainsworth, supra note 2, at 1125.
131. See generally Anthony Champagne & Stuart Nagel, The Psychology of Judging, THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM 261 (Kerr & Bray eds., 1982)(showing that while
"a black judge ... would be expected to have greater understanding of the problems
of racism than a white judge," this is not always the case). But see Batson, 476 U.S. at
135 (stating in a dissenting opinion that group affiliations such as age, race, or occu-
pation as proxy for potential juror partiality have long been accepted as basis for
peremptory challenges); see also HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 22, at 50-51.
132. See, e.g., Peter D. Blanck, What Empirical Research Tells Us: Studying Judges'and Ju-
ries' Behavior, 40 AM. U. L. Rav. 775, 777 (1991); see also Bennett L. Gershman,
How Juries Get It Wrong-Anatomy of the Detroit Terror Case, 44 WASHBURN L.J.
327, 327-28 (2005); Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 1, 5
(1994).
133. As retired West Virginia Justice Neely observed about checks and balances: "There is,
therefore, always an element of human judgment that enters any complicated case,
which is why the process traditionally calls upon the organized collective intelligence
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jurors would bring different life experiences and viewpoints to the
courtroom thereby increasing the likelihood that one view does not pre-
dominate the jury room. With a jury, there is also an opportunity for
voir dire, which cannot be exercised formally with a judge. 34
As scholar and federal judge Jack Weinstein has argued, there are
procedural safeguards in the group process protecting against individual
biases,135 and thus "[t]rial by jury retains its legitimacy precisely because
of its long history of impermeability to the vicissitudes of politics and
fashion. 1 36 The jury has often been described as the "conscience of the
community,"'37 because "[i]t is unaffiliated with party or cause and
speaks for the entire community.'
' 38
3. Perception of the Single Jurist Model
Unified courts and specialized domestic violence courts have pro-
liferated in the United States. The "one judge, one family" unified
model of Family Courts allows for continuity and consistency.'39 Spe-
cialized courts also foster integration of services and offender
of a trial court judge, trial jury, and at least one appellate court." State v. Morgan
Stanley, 459 S.E.2d 906, 914 (W. Va. 1995).
134. Ainsworth, supra note 2, at 1125. Recusals are rarely viable options in any type of
court proceeding, and forum-shopping is not a real option in Family Court. See
Charles Gardner Geyh, Informal Methods ofludicial Discipline, 142 U. PA. L. Rv.
243, 295-96 (1993); Geraghty & Mlyniec, supra note 2, at 439-40.
135. For example, Judge Weinstein states that "it is unlikely that twelve persons chosen at
random from the community will at the same time be struck with a collective will to
ignore a just law or with the same burning political zeal." Hon. Jack B. Weinstein,
Considering Jury "Nullification 7- When May and Should a Jury Reject the Law to Do
Justice, 30 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 239, 244 (1993).
136. Id. at 240; see also Martin F. Kaplan, Cognitive Processes in the Individual Juror, in
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM 197-98 (Norbert L. Kerr & Robert M. Bray
eds., 1982) (showing that even when biases are expressed in jury deliberations, other
jurors serve as neutralizers or correctors).
137. U.S. v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 182 (1st Cir. 1969); see also Witherspoon v. Illinois,
391 U.S. 510, 519-20 n.15 (1968) ("[Olne of the most important functions any jury
can perform in making such a selection is to maintain a link between contemporary
community values and the penal system-a link without which the determination of
punishment could hardly reflect 'the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.'") (citation omitted); Gofen, supra note 98, at 877;
Stephan Landsman, Of Mushrooms and Nullifiers: Rules of Evidence and the American
Jury, 21 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 65, 79 (2002).
138. Landsman, supra note 137, at 79.
139. See, e.g., ELROD & RYDER, supra note 26, at 236; Developments in the Law-The Law
of Marriage and Family, 116 HARv. L. REv. 2099, 2108 (2003) [hereinafter
.Developments]; Integrated Domestic Violence Courts, http://www.courts.state.ny.us/
ip/domesticviolence/index.shtml (last visited Aug. 27, 2006).
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monitoring. 14 Furthermore, in many cases, these courts may improve a
judge's access to information, remedies, and services for an entire fam-
ily, as well as her expertise in a certain subject matter.'41 In applying the
paradigm for a jury option as proposed in this Article, a litigant may
select a jury to provide a fresh perspective on the facts, followed by a
judge who can then fashion an appropriate dispositional remedy for
the particular family. 1
42
The family represents the fabric of society, and yet, as it stands cur-
rently, one person alone can alter a family's entire future. A litigant
might perceive that the capriciousness of a single judge could wreak
havoc upon his or her family. For this reason and others stated previ-
ously, litigants in family violence proceedings should have the option of
whether a judge or a jury will extract, weigh, and consider the compli-
cated and unique facts of their cases.
Some litigants prefer the singular accountability of having one ju-
rist decide the ultimate fate of their cases. For example, in the infamous
case of Leopold and Loeb,'43 Clarence Darrow selected a judge to deter-
mine the fate of the two defendants in a capital case, saying:
[W]e were afraid to submit our cause to a jury .... I know
perfectly well that where responsibility is divided by twelve, it
is easy to say: "Away with him". But ... if these boys hang,
you must do it. There can be no division of responsibility here.
You can never explain that the rest overpowered you. It must
be by your deliberate, cool, premeditated act, without a chance
to shift responsibility.
144
140. See Winick, supra note 10, at 39; Judith S. Kaye, Delivering Justice Today: A Problem-
Solving Approach, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y Rav. 125, 142-43 (2004).
141. See Developments, supra note 139, at 2108 ("'[O]ne family, one judge' case manage-
ment system aims to improve consistency for the family, to eliminate the problems
associated with different judges evaluating discrete aspects of a case, and to increase
the judge's ability to make informed decisions regarding proper outcome goals and
services for the family.")
142. Id. at 2108-09.
143. People v. Leopold and Loeb, http://www.cookcountyclerkofcourt.org/ArchivesI
FamousCases/LeopolLandLoeb/leopoldandloeb.htm) (last visited Aug. 27, 2006).
144. MAUREEN McKERIAN, THE AMAZING CRIME AND TRIAL OF LEOPOLD AND LOEB
216-17 (Gaunt 1996) (1924). A similar analogy can be drawn to a line of death pen-
alty cases where the jury was led to believe that the ultimate responsibility for
determining the appropriateness of a death sentence did not rest with them. See
Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-29 (1985); Mann v. Dugger, 844 F.2d
1446, 1454-55 (1 1th Cir. 1988); Wheat v. Thigpen, 793 F.2d 621, 627-28 (5th
Cir. 1986). I thank Professor Randy Hertz for this insight.
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Other litigants, however, are empowered by being able to tell their
stories to a new or varied audience of peers. This Article advocates that
providing litigants with a choice of forum in family violence cases145 will
enhance their perception of an unbiased decision and likely strengthen
the legitimacy of and compliance with the resultant court orders.
III. RECONCILING THE PRACTICAL OBSTACLES OF JURIES
IN FAMILY VIOLENCE PROCEEDINGS
Despite the theoretical arguments favoring a jury option in family vio-
lence proceedings, those who oppose the right to a jury trial in such
proceedings may raise a number of practical concerns that have not yet
been addressed. Certainly the creation of a jury option where such an op-
tion has been absent is not without logistical obstacles. Valid criticisms may
include: (1) privacy loss; (2) delay, congestion, and cost; and (3) legal com-
plexities not suitable for juror decision-making. The final part of this Article
will address some of these concerns and logistics as the theory of the jury
option in family violence proceedings is applied in practice.
A. Issues of Privacy
Allowing a jury option in family violence proceedings injects a sem-
blance of fairness, but may at the same time compromise privacy. Family
Courts historically were closed to the public due to privacy issues, yet
today, "Sunshine Laws" have swept the nation'46 to allow in the public
and the media. These laws have been enacted, among other reasons, to
monitor attorney professionalism and judicial discretion in Family
145. In fact, this author praises the benefits of unified court system models and specialized
domestic violence courts, but thinks a choice should be offered to highlight how
these court models may be perceived by litigants. The paradigm proposed in this Ar-
ticle dovetails nicely with the "one judge, one family" system in that a jury
determines the facts, and a seasoned judge still determines the disposition. For an ex-
cellent description of how domestic violence courts can operate within the
therapeutic jurisprudence context, encompassing procedural justice theories, see
Winick, supra note 10, at 60-87.
146. See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A
Tale of Innovation Co-Opted or "The Law of ADR", 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 29-30
(1991); Roger A. Nowadzky, A Comparative Analysis of Public Records Statutes, 28 URB.
LAw. 65, 69-70 (1996); David S. Jackson, Privacy and Ohio's Public Records Act, 26
CAP. U. L. REv. 107, 111 (1997) (stating that all 50 states have open records statutes).
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Courts.17 Many of the arguments made in favor of opening Family
Courts to the public and to the media can likewise be made for opening
the Family Court to juries.'48 Furthermore, in those states where Family
Courts are already open, privacy concerns may be somewhat amelio-
rated.'49
Some advocates might argue that a jury's invasion of privacy
would have a chilling effect and dissuade parties from pursuing trials,
especially survivors of family violence. Yet, once a survivor files for an
order of protection, or a governmental agency files a child abuse or
neglect petition, privacy is already jeopardized by that filing. The judge
will hear the allegations, as will the court clerks, the court bailiffs, the
lawyers, and the other parties present. In cases of domestic violence,
facing the batterer in court may be far more traumatic than facing a
group of strangers. 5° More significantly, litigants are not obligated to
choose a jury if privacy concerns are paramount.' Several scholars have
argued that a more formalized adversarial court system actually helps to
level the playing field for survivors of family violence.'
147. Laura Cohen, Kids, Courts, and Cameras: New Challenges for Juvenile Defenders 18
QUINNIPIAc L. REV. 701 (1999).
148. In First Amendment cases there is a definite "nexus between openness, fairness, and the
perception of fairness," which then enhances public confidence in the judicial system and
offers "significant community therapeutic value." Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448
U.S. 555, 570 (1980). A similar argument could be advanced for the jury option.
149. See generally Fred L. Cheesman, Key Findings From the Evaluation of Open Hearings
and Court Records in Juvenile Protection Matters, 1 NAT'L CTR. FOR ST. CTS. 4 (2001)
(finding in 2001 that eighteen states have open child protective proceedings); Cohen,
supra note 147, at 708-09. But see William Wesley Patton, Revictimizing Child Abuse
Victims: An Empirical Rebuttal to the Open Juvenile Dependency Court Reform Move-
ment, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 303,304 (2005).
150. BANCROfr, supra note 39, at 303-05.
151. One could argue that jury trials are more public and therefore more dangerous to a family
violence victim, due to possible exacerbation of the offender's anger. Because of this, each
survivor needs to balance the risks and benefits of filing a petition or even testifying. Each
survivor must decide whether she thinks a jury trial would outweigh the risks inherent in
her case. The risk of a barterer using just one more tool against his partner-in this case, a
jury-is a serious concern of the jury option model. Perhaps some states will require that
all parties consent to a jury trial before it is afforded. Another interesting issue is the child's
tight to privacy. Perhaps a parent's right to demand a jury is nullified if a child will be testi-
fying, unless the testimony is elicited in a less traumatic or less intrusive manner than open
court, such as in camera or dosed circuit. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.31(2) (West
2005) ("If the hearing involves a child victim or witness.., the court may order the taking
and allow the use of a videotaped deposition."); Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
152. See Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers fir Women, 100 YALE L.J.
1545, 1608-09 (1991) (arguing that more formal procedures may be safer for the woman
and her interests than the less formal mediation process); Geraghty & Mlyniec, supra note
2, at 444. Moreover, as Professor Ptacek notes "[u]nlike judges in criminal cases, judges
hearing requests for restraining orders have no standard list of things that must be said
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Thus, the option of a jury in such cases may actually empower these
survivors."'
Additionally, some may perceive the Family Court to be a some-
what "second-class court system."'54 The introduction of the jury into
Family Court jurisprudence may very well elevate this oft-referenced
lower status. If nothing else, the injection of the jury may encourage the
public to envision the Family Court as being on par with other courts,
as juries are part of the popular culture or traditional expectation of how
155court systems operate.
B. Issues of Delay and Limited Resources
Opponents to a jury option in family violence cases may argue that
the costs and delays of juries are prohibitive. Indeed, one of the essential
benefits of Family Court jurisprudence is its goal of swift justice to pro-
mote safety, stability, and the interests of justice for families and
about the right to counsel, the right to a trial by jury, or other rights. In these hearings,
judges write their own scripts." PTACEK, supra note 8, at 98-99. Professor Barbara Atwood
argues that less procedure and less formality can lead to dangerous results and possible vio-
lations of due process rights. See Barbara Atwood, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and American
Family Law: A Modest Caveat About Our Good Intentions (Aug. 1, 2005) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author). Looking at law through a so-called therapeutic lens can
sometimes be "anti-therapeutic" to litigants. Id.
153. See, e.g., Edna Erez & Joanne Belknap, In Their Own Words: Battered Women's As-
sessment of the Criminal Processing System's Responses, 13 VIOLENCE AND VICTIMs 251,
264 (1998) ("[T]he 'one size fits all' solution to battered women's plight.., is likely
to deepen the sense of powerlessness and exacerbate the frustration characteristic of
those enmeshed in battering relationships.").
154. See generally Hon. Nancy Corsones, A Week in the Life of a Family Court Judge, 24
VER. B. J. & L. DIG. 17, 17 (1998); ABRAMs & RAMSEY, supra note 112, at 1185 (and
citing In re Javier A., 159 Cal. App. 3d 913 (Ct. App. 1984)); Ainsworth, supra note
2, at 1119 ("The perfunctory bench trial typical of juvenile court is not what [liti-
gants] imagine a trial to be."); Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness,
Criminal Responsibility, and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68, 68
(1997) [hereinafter Feld, Abolish] (asserting that Family Courts in some states have
morphed into "scaled-down, second-class criminal court[s]for young people.").
155. Lawrence M. Friedman, Law, Lawyers, and Popular Culture, 98 YALE L.J. 1579,
1598-1606 (1989). Some have argued that privacy in custody proceedings should
depend upon an individual case analysis, and presumably the same could be true re-
garding a jury option in family violence cases, if juries would compromise the safety
of children or survivors of violence. Gofen, supra note 98, at 879-80. One could ar-
gue that due to the delicate and private nature of family violence proceedings and the
underlying goal of reunification for a family, Family Courts should be closed to the
public. See San Bernardino County Dept. of Pub. Soc. Servs. v. Superior Court, 283
Cal. Rptr. 332, 340 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), as cited in Patton, supra note 149.
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children. 156 Concerns that juries would cause delay are mitigated, how-
ever, by judges remaining as finders of fact in cases needing immediate
decisions, such as emergency removals of children or temporary protec-
tive orders.157
Moreover, many cases in Family Court are heard in small segments
over the course of months, even years.158 Perhaps a jury will actually ex-
pedite the trials and ensure continuous and uninterrupted testimony
over days instead of fragmented segments of evidence over months and
years, as is common in Family Courts. Not all bench trials themselves
result in instant decisions immediately following a hearing;"' many
complex issues require judges and law clerks to review case law and
statutory law, review transcripts, weigh the testimony, consult treatises,
and encapsulate decisions in writing. Thus, a concern about the delib-
erations themselves taking up time may be in truth misplaced, as jury
deliberations may actually quicken the process.
Research shows that the number of litigants who would in fact
choose to have a jury trial, as well as those who actually proceed to jury
trial, would probably not be as numerous as anticipated.16 As author
156. See, e.g., N.Y. FAMILY COURT ACT § 1011.
157. In some states like Maine and Pennsylvania, where civil protective order hearings
must occur within a certain number of days, the jury option may not be realistic. 19-
A ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4006 (1964); 23 PA. STAT. ANN. § 6107(a) (West 2001).
Yet, some have argued that temporary orders of protection could be extended further
so as to allow due process and procedural rights to the accused abuser. Epstein, Tem-
pering, supra note 5, at 1873 n.137.
158. One of the major complaints about the current Family Court system is the lengthy
delay that often occurs. See In re C.R., 843 N.E.2d 1188, 1189 (Ohio 2006); Flango
& Rubin, supra note 8, at 15; Geraghty & Mlyniec, supra note 2, at 445; Hon. Ge-
rald W. Hardcastle, ADVERSARIALIsM AND THE FAMILY COURT: A FAMILY COURT
JUDGE'S PERSPECTIVE, 9 U.C. DAVIS J. Juv. L. & POL'Y 57, 64 n. 16 (2005).
159. See Mark Hardin, Child Protection Cases in a Unified Family Court, 32 FAM. L.Q.
147, 193-94 (1998). However, this is not always the case, as some judges make up
their minds regarding a case well before closing arguments are made. See Guggenheim
& Hertz, supra note 40, at 581.
160. See, e.g., Winick, supra note 10, at 44 (explaining that the "overwhelming majority"
of batterers do not request trials). Arizona has implemented jury trials in termination
of parental rights cases; less than 175 jury trials were requested over the course of a
year across the entire state. See H.B. 2559. 47th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2006); Ann
E. Freedman, Fact-Finding in Civil Domestic Violence Cases: Secondary Traumatic
Stress and the Need for Compassionate Witnesses, 11 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L.
567, 584 (2003) ("Domestic violence victims often settle out of court for less protec-
tion, aware that making the case before a judge may expose them to unacceptable
safety risks or require more evidentiary and advocacy resources than they have avail-
able."). In fact, some have even referred to the percentage of custody cases which
result in trial as "miniscule." Harriet Newman Cohen, When Custody is Truly Con-
tested, Who Decides Best Interests?, N.Y.L.J., June 6, 2005, at 9; see also Melton &
Lind, supra note 111, at 74; Marc Galanter, At a Glance: The Changing U.S. Jury
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John Guinther argues, "juries have a function even when they aren't
functioning." 161 In other words, litigants often decide whether or not to
proceed to trial based on the expected result. ' The prospect of a jury
trial could increase favorable pre-litigation resolutions, thus decreasing
the backlog and delay inherent in many of today's Family Courts. 
163
In terms of resources, states could utilize smaller jury pools and ju-
ries. For example, some states allow for six jurors instead of twelve in
certain proceedings, which has been held constitutional by the U.S. Su-
preme Court.i64 Virginia has a statute that allows for a jury of three in
certain civil cases.' 65 In Colorado and Wisconsin, for instance, a jury of
six is allowed for questions of fact in child protective proceedings.
16
Other jury models deserve mention as well. For example, as the
Court proffered in McKeiver, an advisory jury might be an appropriate
option, and is already permitted in many types of cases under current
state law.167 If the judge agrees, members of the jury may render a discre-
tionary opinion to the bench,168 although it is unclear if the specific
argument for an advisory jury has ever prevailed in a Family Court pro-
ceeding. 69 The option of a jury of six peers, or an advisory jury, while
System, National Public Radio, available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyld=4695497 (last visited Aug. 27, 2006) ("On the criminal side, some
15 percent of criminal defendants were tried in 1962, but less than 5 percent in
2002. In spite of rising numbers of defendants, the absolute number of trials was 30
percent lower in 2002 than in 1962."); id. ("The percentage of civil cases reaching
trial in the federal courts has fallen from 11 percent in 1962 to 1.8 percent in 2002.
Trials have declined despite an increase in case filings over 1962-2002. In the federal
courts, civil filings increased by a factor of five; trials fell by some 20 percent.").
161. GUINTHER, supra note 1, at xv.
162. Id.
163. See generally Geraghty & Mlyniec, supra note 2, at 441.
164. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 236-237 (1978). See generally Williams v. Florida,
399 U.S. 78 (1970) (holding that a twelve-person jury is not a constitutional re-
quirement in state trials).
165. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-359(D) (2006).
166. COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-3-202 (2005); Wis. STAT. § 48.31 (2005).
167. See Kropf, supra note 59, at 2167. New Jersey permits litigants to consent to the use
of a jury, even if the claim was not one in which a right to a jury trial historically ex-
isted. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 4:35-2 (West 2004); Pasternak, supra note 68. Some
states which have a right to an advisory jury include: Virginia, VA. CODE ANN.
§ 16.1-296 (2004); Colorado, COLO. R. Crv. P. § 39 (2005); Kentucky, Ky. R. CIv.
P. 39.03 (2006); Michigan, MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 712A.17(2) (West 2005);
Ohio, OHIO Clv. R. 39 (2005); and Vermont, VT. R. Civ. P. § 39 (2005).
168. VA. CODE ANN. § 8 .01-336(e) (2005); In re Bates, 38 Va. Cir. 515 (Cir. Ct. 1992);
In re Nichols, 14 Va. Cir. 341 (Cir. Ct. 1989).
169. This right was requested in In re Nichos, 14 Va. Cir. 341, for a child custody action,
but the request was denied.
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not ideal, could be the first step in a transition toward jury options in
Family Court proceedings.
Moreover, scholars who have studied the actual data and statistics
regarding American jury trials have found that "[t]he availability of the
jury does not lengthen the time a case stays in the court system," 70 and,
in fact, "in civil cases juries may represent a net savings in taxpayer dol-
lars due to the settlements their presence induces." 7 '
Although jury trials are costly, bench trials also incur substantial171
costs. If an argument against juries is based solely on a lack of financial
resources, it communicates to family violence litigants that there are
adequate resources to protect liberty interests in some cases,1 73 but not
enough resources to protect lives at risk or children who are being re-
moved from their homes. Ultimately, we as a society are sending an
implicit message that the value we place on justice is inextricably linked
| 174
to the cost.
C. Issues of Legal Complexity
The complexities and depths of family violence cannot always be
distilled into mere legal theories or laws. The facts and frailty of families
in the court system are wrought with intricate and highly sensitive is-
sues. Nevertheless, lack of a formal legal education is not a valid reason
to be disqualified from deliberating such important cases. In fact, life
experiences often supersede formal education in terms of wisdom. Fam-
ily violence proceedings may be more suitable for jurors as decision-
makers to parse out facts, as the complexity of facts in many such cases
might be better considered from several individual perspectives. More-
over, the body of law governing family violence proceedings in most
states is not overly complex. The combination of potentially complex
facts without a complicated body of law may be well-suited to juror de-
cision-making. Additionally, jurors address issues of domestic violence
170. GUINTHER, supra note 1, at 168.
171. Id.
172. See, e.g., E. Allan Lind, The Psychology of Courtroom Procedure, in THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF THE COURTROOM 13, 33 (Norbert L. Kerr & Robert M. Bray eds., 1982).
173. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.; U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
174. See Flango & Rubin, supra note 8, at 38-39; Kropf, supra note 59, at 2176 (arguing
that denying the right to a jury "should not depend on the potential for delay or
cost"); Eric K. Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat to the Value of Accessible Courts for Mi-
norities, 25 HAJv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 341, 354 (1990).
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regularly in the criminal courts and are capable of reaching sound ver-
dicts. 75
Jurors routinely consider complicated areas of law in cases such as se-
curities fraud and intellectual property.176 In medical malpractice cases, for
example, a jury must decide whether a physician exercised the standard of
care that an average physician in the community would exercise. 7 7 Like-
wise, in a child neglect case, a jury should be able to determine whether or
not a parent exercised a "minimum degree of care."'78 Such issues are not
outside the ken of jurors who are entrusted to decide cases by linking in-
tricate facts with their own knowledge and experience.
Another concern may be that a jury deciding the facts in family vio-
lence proceedings may reflect misconceptions about domestic violence.
Indeed, the public's erroneous beliefs might include any number of the
following misconceptions: (1) Men are always the abusers, and women are
always the victims; 79 (2) Violence does not exist or is just a private matter;
(3) He or she could have or should have left the abuser;180 (4) A large
175. See generally Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. Rzv. 747,
812-14 (2005); HANs & VIDMAR, supra note 22, at 153 (noting that even as far back
as the 1950s "juries responded sympathetically to victims of spouse abuse in a man-
ner reminiscent of today's public concern with this major social problem"). But see
De Sanctis, supra note 86, at 374 ("The jury may be gender biased, prejudiced
against victims of domestic violence, and suffer from a 'belief in a just world' [and
thus not want to believe domestic violence exists].") Yet, De Sanctis also argues that
judges can have some of these same misconceptions in domestic violence cases. De
Sanctis, supra note 86, at 367 n.46.
176. See generally Philippe Signore, On the Role ofluries in Patent Litigation, 83 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 791, 793-94 (2001) (acknowledging that juries have a role
in patent litigation in the United States); Lisa von der Mehden, The Role of the Jury
and the Court in Assessing Front Pay Awards Under the Age Discrimination in Employ-
mentAct, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 1475, 1494 (1991).
177. See John Gibeaut, The Med-Mal Divide, 85 A.B.A.J. 39, 39-44 (March 2005). See
generally Costantino v. Herzog, 203 F.3d 164, 174 (2d Cir. 2000). In other coun-
tries, citizens often decide cases as lay magistrates in conjunction with actual judges.
See Valerie P. Hans, The Jury's Role in Administering Justice in the United States: U.S.
Jury Reform: The Active Jury and the Adversarial deal, 21 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv.
85, 85 (2002). Those who advocate for mixed tribunals and those who advocate for
juries often argue the same reasons, such as legitimacy, community values, diversity,
and group decision-making. Id.
178. See N.Y. FAMILY COURT ACT § 1012(0; see also Nicholson v. Scopperta, 3 N.Y.3d
357, 368 (2004).
179. See supra note 11; see also Detschelt, supra note 11, at 249; Suzanne K. Steinmetz &
Joseph S. Lucca, Husband Battering, in HANDBOOK OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 233-46
(Vincent B. Van Hasselt etal. eds., 1988).
180. Kurtz, supra note 88, at 1360; PTACEK, supra note 8, at 121 ("[W]omen's feelings
about themselves, their abusive partners, and their situations are part of a dynamic in-
teractional process .... [The] response of institutions to women's help-seeking has a
great impact on women's emotional and cognitive responses to violence.")
[Vol. 13:1
INTRODUCING THE CONSTRUCT OF THE JURY
brawny survivor of violence abused by a small scrawny batterer is not be-
lievable;"' or (5) Survivors always return to their abusers, so how bad
could it have been, or was he or she lying in the first place?
182
Yet, even when trained, judges and lawyers may harbor some of
these same misconceptions."' Moreover, if one were to argue that due to
a judge's training,"8 acumen, and experience, he or she is most equipped
to determine cases involving family violence, one must remember that
our legal system is not founded upon who is better equipped to hear a
case, but rather upon fundamental fairness in the courtroom. Again,
litigants in family violence proceedings need to have confidence in the
court system and court rulings. A jury option may be a viable alternative
for litigants who fear the power granted to a single jurist, and who sus-
pect that any order from a single jurist is inherently unjust.
Also, a judge already trained in the dynamics of domestic violence
retains the option of rejecting the theories and foundations of such
training and may not choose to draw upon this knowledge in making
her decisions and rulings. Notably, many Family Court judges do not
encourage expert testimony about the dynamics and basics of domestic
violence, nor do they favor lawyers pontificating about the dynamics
during bench trials.8 Expert witnesses, who might enhance a bench
trial by addressing the textured nuances associated with family violence
in a particular case, are ultimately more of an anomaly in domestic
181. Duthu, supra note 11, at 30 (acknowledging the myth that "the barterer will always
be bigger and physically stronger than the victim").
182. See PTACEK, supra note 8, at 70; Elisabeth Ayyildiz, When Battered Woman's Syndrome
Does Not Go Far Enough: The Battered Woman as Vigilante, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER &
LAw 141, 144 (1995); De Sanctis, supra note 86, at 373; Letendre, supra note 78, at
981; Raeder, supra note 78, at 794-95.
183. BANCROFT, supra note 39, at 294-96; De Sanctis, supra note 86, at 372; Deborah
Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the Roles of Prose-
cutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINiSM 3, 6 (1999) (discussing
"the long-standing hostility exhibited by court personnel and judges toward domestic
violence complainants"); Meier, supra note 82, at 688.
184. The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges mandates: "All judges
must be trained in the dynamics of family violence and how to address it fairly and
properly.... Additional training will better enable judges to understand these com-
plex issues, become more sensitive to the barriers facing victims, and eliminate any
gender bias which contributes to the judicial system's failure to afford the protection
of the law to the victims of family violence." HON. STEPHEN B. HERRELL & MERE-
DITH HOFFORD, FAMILY VIOLENCE: IMPROVING COURT PRACTICE 11, 16 (1990).
185. See generally Jane H. Aiken & Jane C. Murphy, Dealing with Complex Evidence of
Domestic Violence: A Primer for the Civil Bench, 39 CT. REv. 12, 12-13 (2002);
Freedman, supra note 160, at 582 n.45.
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violence cases in Family Court.'86 This is true despite the fact that expert
testimony may provide invaluable assistance to a judge or jury and pre-
vent decisions based solely on emotions or misconceptions.'""
This Article proposes a paradigm that offers litigants an opportu-
nity to have the facts determined freshly by the jury and the law applied
keenly by the experienced judge. In this model, the judge decides the
ultimate disposition for a family. The judge also retains the customary
judicial authority and control, such as ruling on evidentiary objections
and on which facts are relevant, dismissing or severing charges, vetoing a
highly unreasonable verdict, 8 and ultimately determining the best in-
terests of the child. Thus, the judge addresses the legal complexities and
technicalities and allows the jury to focus upon the facts.
Ultimately, we can refer back to the 1968 seminal case of Duncan
v. Louisiana, 89 in which Justice White explains:
[A]t the heart of the dispute have been express or implicit as-
sertions that juries are incapable of adequately understanding
evidence or determining issues of fact, and that they are un-
predictable, quixotic, and little better than a roll of dice. Yet,
the most recent and exhaustive study of the jury in criminal
cases concluded that juries do understand the evidence and
186. See generally Aiken & Murphy, supra note 185, at 13-15; Freedman, supra note 160,
at 578-79; Evan Stark, Symposium on Reconceptualizing Violence Against Women By
Intimate Partners: Critical Issues, Re-Presenting Woman Battering: From Battered
Woman Syndrome to Coercive Controh 58 ALB. L. REv. 973, 974 (1995) ("Among the
most important legal innovations in criminal and civil proceedings involving domes-
tic violence is the admission of expert testimony.")
187. Certainly, there are costs associated with expert witnesses, yet such witnesses could
include domestic violence advocates or shelter counselors who may even testify for
low cost (assuming they would qualify as experts under state law). Furthermore, con-
cerns that juries are overly swayed by emotion or irrelevant factors have not been
replicated in actual research. See Horowitz & Willging, supra note 75, at 174-75 (cit-
ing Visher studies). Some have argued that juries operate fairly and equitably instead
of focusing merely upon the intricacies of the law. See HANs & VIDMA, supra note
22, at 116. Moreover, with expert testimony or education about how survivors may
present themselves, finders of fact can see beyond the mere appearances of survivors
during the fact-finding process. Meier, supra note 82, at 688. Studies show that after
serving on juries, jurors leave the courtroom more educated, more informed and with
a higher regard for the court system overall. See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 22, at
19. See generally STEPHEN J. ADLER, THE JURY 242 (1994). If adding the jury option
to family violence cases secondarily educates the public about the issue, then the
model is that much more worthwhile.
188. Judges can overrule juries at times. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b). Rule 50 consoli-
dated both directed verdicts and judgments notwithstanding the verdict into
"judgment as a matter of law." See id.
189. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
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come to sound conclusions in most of the cases presented to
them and that when juries differ with the result at which the
judge would have arrived, it is usually because they are serving
some of the very purposes for which they were created and for
which they are now employed. 190
CONCLUSION
Regrettably, a paucity of state statutes allow juries in family vio-
lence cases. Jury trials should be an option in limited circumstances in
Family Court cases. Specifically, it is critical to consider the option of a
jury trial in the adjudicative portion of family offense proceedings and
child protective proceedings addressing allegations of family violence.
A litigant should have the option to have the jury decide the facts, and
then have the judge apply the law and craft the appropriate remedy.
Confidence in the judicial system, as held by the public in general
and the litigants in particular, is undoubtedly critical on many levels.
There may initially be valid concerns that juries in family violence pro-
ceedings might affect privacy or backlog. Yet in the final analysis,
introducing the construct of juries into Family Court jurisprudence will
assuredly improve the perception and trust in the legal system overall.
Increased formality in the Family Court system and the right to a jury
option may very well enhance the integrity and perceived legitimacy of
such proceedings, as well as the legal system as a whole. 9'
If a judicial system is to operate fairly, it must engender the good
will and trust of the community that it seeks to protect and upon which
it will dispense its justice. In family violence cases, the perception of un-
fairness may jeopardize a family's ability to function beyond a court case
and adhere to durable and workable solutions. If litigants and families
who entrust their lives to be judged and determined by a court perceive
a biased system-whether or not such bias exists-it threatens to erode
the perception of fairness and balance that the court system was in-
tended to provide. t
190. Id at 157 (citing H. KALVEN, JR. & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 4, n.2 (1996)).
191. See generally Gofen, supra note 98, at 861 (citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982)).
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